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Kathryn English
 
Introduction
1 Terminology theory and metaphor theory can be mutually enriching. Metaphor theory
uses the concept of assumptive frameworks, as well as source and target fields to clarify
how metaphors function. Terminology theory describes conceptual space, and defines
terms in a way that could subsequently explain them. Within the framework of Language
for Specific Purposes, concepts roam from one field to another and this illustrates the
need for a pragmatic perspective to define meaning. We will first examine how metaphor
theory and terminology can work together to facilitate access to scientific concepts via
description, explanation and definition. We will then explore in more detail the use of
assumptive frameworks in relativist or defined (demetaphored) contexts.
 
1. Metaphor theory and learning in the sciences
2 Students learning science need to associate theoretical descriptions and explanations of
how  things  in  the  universe  work  with  common  sense,  or  knowledge  derived  from
everyday experience. This process builds up background knowledge or theory and can
provoke what philosophers refer to as intuition dissonance, when common sense and
theory  conflict.  Resolution  of  dissonance  requires  retracing  historical  steps  or  using
heuristic devices of rationalisation. For example, understanding the heliocentric universe
(with the sun at the centre) makes more sense once one has understood the ways in
which the geocentric model is inadequate. On the other hand we can all understand how
easy it is to believe that the Sun might revolve around the Earth since we see it rise from
the East and set, reliably, in the West.
3 Contemporary metaphor theory was born within the context of analytical philosophy. In
his  seminal  article  entitled  “Metaphor”  the  American philosopher,  Max Black  (1955)
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introduced  the  concept  of  assumptive  frameworks or  systems  of  associated
commonplaces to describe how intuitively dissonant statements can be explained in
understandable words and then shared with others using the traditional rhetorical device
known as metaphor. An assumptive framework allows us to filter out what appears to be
useless  information  —the  unused  part  of  metaphor—  and  focus  on  what  we  deem
pertinent for the statement, text, or problem at hand. Take, for example, this famous
metaphor, expressed as a truth value, “Man is a wolf”. We express the new or unusual,
the target, in terms of concepts which are better known and assumed to be commonly
shared, the source (Fig. 1a). When several source fields interact, a new mental space is
opened. This is known as conceptual blending (Fig.1b). (Rohrer 1997; Fauconnier 1997)
 
Figure 1. A visual representation of Black’s interaction hypothesis
4 In  the  example  above,  we  describe  the  cruelty  of  mankind by  activating  a  common
assumptive framework. We automatically filter out information which is unused (four-
footed, furry, having fangs, etc.) and concentrate on a highly-specific and tailor-designed-
for-the-task-at-hand system of associated commonplaces. In this case we focus on the
characteristics of being wild, ferocious, dangerous (Fig.2). It doesn’t really matter if what
we assume about something,  and therefore focus on,  is  inaccurate.  Are wolves really
fierce?  Zoologists  indicate  the  contrary;  wolves  are  not  fierce  but  rather  cowardly
mammals. Such comparisons rely on a common cultural background which is currently
under  examination  in  the  Figurative  Language  Network  discussion  list  (
fln@mailbase.ac.uk). In fact, the wolves we know are literary creatures. They come from
folk tales or comic strips. This reinforces their character stereotype at the expense of
more objectified dictionary definitions.
 
Figure 2. When a metaphor is operational we focus on a selection of features and this activates a
perspective or opens a new mental space. 
 
5 However, as with any statement, it is the pragmatic perspective that defines meaning. A
point of view is essential to grasping any metaphor. Misunderstood or spoiled metaphors
are frequently the result of differing interpretations across cultures. Language teachers
know  and  use  the  concept  of  cross-cultural  perspectives  on  a  daily  basis.  They
Understanding science: when metaphors become terms
ASp, 19-22 | 1998
2
instinctively take into account the fact that someone is speaking to someone else about a
given  subject.  The  context  designates  grammatical  subjects,  situates  time  frames,
determines which articles are used or provides naturally correct prepositions. In a similar
way, scientific models also appear to refer to assumptive frameworks —those in which
their legitimacy is grounded. 
6 Learning  in  the  technical  sciences  entails  the  appropriation  of  concepts  and precise
quantification  techniques.  This,  however,  should  in  no  way  exclude  metaphoric
qualitative  explanation  and  the  activation  of potentially  contradictory  systems  of
associated  commonplaces.  More  concretely,  scientific  texts  contain  elements  of
description,  definition  and  explanation.  All  three  dimensions  interact  to  produce
meaningful communication. We will examine them below.
 
1.1. Description
7 Description of phenomena can come in the form of verbal rules. Electricity flows from the
negative to the positive pole. The literal description of Ohm's law is current = voltage/
resistance or  (I=V/R).  The description of  processes may also list  the order  of  events
required  to  reach  a  given  (desired)  stage  of  development.  For  example,  in  data-
processing, instructions can be given in a strictly linear, hierarchical and sequential form,
such as in the MS-DOS computer operating system. Alternatively, instructions may be
presented  metaphorically,  via  the  more  user-friendly,  Graphic  User  Interface  (GUI)
depicting  a  desktop.  The  MAC  OS  and  Windows  95  operating  system  use  these
metaphorical techniques to make complex computer technology seem simple to ordinary
users.
8 The underlying assumption behind the linear vision of description is that the world exists
in an objectively literal form and the scientist’s task is to find straightforward ways of
describing it. Similarly, the linguist working in specialised languages tends to identify
objective observation with literal language.
Science is supposed to be characterised by precision and the absence of ambiguity,
and  the  language  of  science  is  assumed  to  be  correspondingly  precise  and
unambiguous —in short, literal. (Ortony 1993: 1)
9 However, literal language is not necessarily objective and literal statements certainly do
not guarantee objectivity. Attitudes about language itself are often expressed by linguists
in  terms  of  generic  metaphors.  The  conduit  metaphor,  presented  by  M.  Reddy  of
Columbia University (in Ortony 1993: 167) illustrates how this objective and literal view of
language may operate.  Language is seen as a carrier of  ideas,  values,  and beliefs.  The
listener unpacks the message to take out what was in it. Reddy provides an extensive list of
expressions in English to support this idea. A selection of his examples follow:
You have to put each concept into words very carefully. 
Insert those ideas elsewhere in the paragraph.
Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words.
Try to get your thoughts across better.
10 Scientific description and attitudes toward language share the notion that both seem to
be framed by the same objectivist paradigm. Learning to use or already using a language
is  mistakenly  assumed  to  be  like  learning  a  scientific  concept.  It  is  a  question  of
transmitting information from someone who knows to someone who doesn’t know yet. 
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11 Substantial  grassroots  work  in  the  ESP  field  (autonomous  learning,  learner
empowerment, guided autonomy), however, points to a different perspective. It is hardly
necessary in these pages to suggest that language learners do not merely memorise words
or rules of grammar. More emphatically, the physiopsychologist J.F. Lambert, suggested
during the CERCLES conference in Bordeaux 1997 that using language involves action,
“Pour apprendre une langue il  faut la prendre”.  In other words,  learning a language
necessarily entails learner empowerment. This would imply activating or modifying his/
her assumptive frameworks.
12 The use  of  language  (Langue),  and its  instantiation  (Parole),  is  testimony to  effective
appropriation. For this, learners need more than to cram the formula behind it. They
require an understanding of the causes and effects of language. In the world of science
this would be formulated as the concept of explanation.
 
1.2. Explanation
13 Explanation differs from description in that it seeks to elucidate the mechanisms that
underpin  the  descriptive  rules.  Recourse  to  instructive  metaphor  is  frequent  when
abstract concepts must be learned. Richard E. Mayer from the University of California at
Santa  Barbara  quotes  a  well-known  scientific  textbook  which  explicitly  compares
electricity to water flowing in pipes to explain Ohm’s law.
To  understand  this  idea,  compare  the  pictures  of  pipes.  [Pictures  show  water
coming  out  of  a  narrow  pipe  and  water  coming  out  of  a  wide  pipe.]  The  only
difference in the pipe is their diameters. The pump pushes water equally in both
cases. But more water passes through the pipe with the large opening. The larger
pipe offers less resistance to the flow of water than the smaller pipe. In a similar
way, more current flows through a conductor with less resistance than through a
conductor with more resistance. (Mayer in Ortony 1993: 562)
14 Clearly  the  verbal  description  of  Ohm’s  law,  given  in  section  1.1,  is  shorter,  more
economic than the wordy explanation. However, the re-deployment of the visual analogy
with pipes allows the students to intuitively grasp the abstract concepts and make the
verbal law, i.e. the law of physics expressed in words, real. In the case of the well-known
metaphor,  Internet-is-an-information  superhighway,  larger  cables  are  frequently
depicted as transmitting information at a faster rate. In reality, just like the truth value of
wolves  being  fierce,  the  modern,  narrow  cables  use  higher  bit  rates  to  carry  more
information. This ‘intuitively dissonant' metaphor functions well —even if the underlying
reality is false. So, although succinct mathematical notation is sometimes unavoidable, so
are the half-truths of metaphor which often underpin the equations.
...Description without explanation is incomplete ... literal precision without models
or metaphors of the underlying mechanisms is sterile. (Mayer in Ortony 1993: 566)
15 Description  and  explanation  go  hand  in  hand  in  both  developing  concepts  and
communicating them to others. But, on the other hand, definitions, are used to situate
and limit the conceptual space designated by specific concepts. They tie the metaphorical
to the literal and situate mental spaces within flexible terminological trees.
 
1.3. Definition (demetaphoring)
16 It  is  well  known  that  definitions  of  scientific  concepts  are  often  difficult  or  even
impossible to  understand for  the  uninitiated reader.  A  selection of  characteristics  is
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retained in order to distinguish the generic hyperonym from a more specific hyponym.
Descriptions  are  therefore  trimmed to  their  necessary  and sufficient  minimums and
explanation is considered superfluous. Take for example this definition, in French, of the
concept cellule in topology, a field of mathematics dealing with Euclidean spaces.
 
Table 1
17 It is assumed that the person consulting the mathematics dictionary where this definition
was  given  possesses  sufficient  conceptual  baggage  to  understand  the  lexical  and
notational items at work. For the linguist more explanation may be necessary. He may
look  up  another  dictionary,  which  makes  learning  long  and  laborious.  In  addition,
definitions  usually  deal  with  dead metaphors  as  we will  see  below.  The concept  cell
involves a specified area which can assume any shape and is defined by its interior, its
boundary (homeomorphic or not) and this also implies the existence of an exterior. For
example, a lump of clay can assume any shape, but its overall volume or topological space
remains constant. It is homeomorphous if there are no holes or corners in its boundary.
The concept and its name, cell,  appear to have phenomenological or experiential and
metaphoric origins.1 In his well-known book, Metaphors We Live By, the American linguist
George Lakoff,  lays out the linguistic basis for metaphoric grounding using extensive
examples drawn from everyday, non specialised language. For example, the /containe/r
scheme reflects one of the most fundamental human instincts —that of territory.
We are physical  beings,  bounded and set  off  from the rest  of  the world by the
surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. Each of
us  is  a  container,  with a  bounding surface  and an in-out  orientation.  (Lakoff  &
Johnson 1980: 29)
18 Thus, the grammar of everyday language is testimony to the relation between language
and an individual perception of reality. In a sentence, content words and grammatical
words interact. This interactive association introduces a specific framework or series of
shared commonplaces. Here are some of Lakoff’s examples (1980: 30-31):
• The Visual Field = a container The ship is coming into view.  I have him in sight. (...)
• Events, Actions, Activities, and States = container object
Are you in the race on Saturday ?
Halfway into the race, I ran out of energy. (...)
• Activities viewed as containers
In washing the window, I splashed water all over the floor. [...]
19 In these examples it is relatively straightforward to see how the speaker experiences his
universe.
20 In the definition of the concept cellule,  the term may be considered what the Belgian
terminologist Rita Temmerman refers to as demetaphored (1995: 110). In fact, the device of
figurative language that is first used to explain and describe (perhaps even invent) a
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notion is subsequently transformed into a standardised term which,  via definition,  is
granted the prestige of literal language. The standardised definition confers official term
recognition  to  what  may  have  previously  been  a  fluctuating  value  due  to  visibly
metaphorical expression. The act of ‘demetaphorisation’ is the product of a discourse
community  which  includes  not  only  authors  and  readers  but  also  a  specified
communication situation which would guarantee  reference to  the shared assumptive
frameworks mentioned above.
21 However,  the  concept  cellule is  subject  to  multiple  interpretations  according  to  the
specific purpose required by the user. In one case I consulted a pure mathematician who
felt  the concept  could not  be represented visually  since,  by definition, it  exists  in n 
dimensions  and  can  take  on  any  form.  Later,  an  engineer  deployed  the  same
mathematical notation to represent the concept visually. This representation is given in
figure 3.
 
Figure 3. One possible, two-dimensional representation of the concept cell in topology
22 Is either one ‘correct'? The mathematician is perhaps correct in respecting to the letter
the notational definition of n dimensions. The engineer needs to bend the truth to give a
usable, visual representation. Both use the concept for their own specific purposes and
interpret the notation according to their own assumptive frameworks. The mathematical
notation is however, considered unambiguous. It can be applied, or reproduced to give
predictable results.
23 But how do students go about learning both precise formulae as well as reductive or
blatantly  false  metaphoric  descriptions?  From  the  perspective  of  defining  dissonant
assumptive frameworks it is interesting to note how students read verbal or notational
information.
2. Using assumptive frameworks to retain scientific
concepts
24 We have seen how metaphor can be used to describe and perhaps even create a new
conceptual, mental space. Water flowing through pipes, imaginary information highways
and  graphic  user  interface  (GUI)  desktops  or  imaginary,  homeomorphic  boundaries
present  an approximate image but  a  representation that  is  sufficient  to access  some
understanding of the abstract concepts under consideration. A strong analogy can help
the student learn an underlying process and this approach can be refined by quantifying
the situation using different mathematical notation.
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25 Research in the cognitive sciences has suggested that the mental model students use, i.e.
the mental metaphor, influences how they go about formulating mathematical notation.
For example, students who used the flowing water metaphor to solve problems related to
Ohm’s  law  performed  differently  than  those  who  used  a  different,  teeming  crowd
metaphor  (where  current  is  seen  as  particles  clinging  together).  Macintosh  users
automatically file metaphorical dossiers in metaphorical trash cans which become plump
when filled. MS-DOS users learn how to delete by checking a codebox. The metaphor
structures the argument, albeit unwittingly.
26 Not only do formulations differ according to the metaphor in use but information appears
to possess different priority levels. Research on expertise in scientific problem solving
suggests that experts 
 […] rely initially on qualitative reasoning and, if the problem requires it, employ
quantitative  models  after  they  had  [sic]  analysed  the  problem  in  conceptual,
qualitative terms. (White & Frederiksen,1987: 281)
27 Analysis of students’ eye movements when solving arithmetic word problems show that
successful students look first at the words in the problem before looking at the numbers
(Hegarty, Mayer & Green 1992: 76-84). In scientific problems, it would seem that solving
qualitative reasoning precedes quantitative calculation. Curiously then, the function of
explanation appears to precede description.
Unless one presupposes that most of the work of grasping the metaphor has already
occurred , the ‘literal’ definition may not do the trick at all. (Petrie 1976)
28 Assumptive frameworks are essential to the interpretation of metaphors as well as the
appropriation of scientific models. Highlighting essential characteristics and screening
unused portions of metaphors (the furry, four-footedness of wolves in the “Man is a wolf”
metaphor), not only conveys the message but puts a living, culturally-grounded author
behind it. The economy of language, a defining characteristic of LSP, is preserved by the
automatic activation of a common assumptive framework. The conventional transparent
windowpane metaphor used to describe scientific prose, has given way to a discourse
umbrella, which more accurately describes the situation of a technical author, a language
teacher, or a student all working within their own series of assumptive frameworks. Their
interaction takes place within a defined setting, or an assumed communication situation
which  can  range  from  the  classroom  to  the  technical  journal.  It  is  their  shared
expectations that foster understanding. 
29 In  this  section  we  have  examined  how  metaphors  can  provide  the  descriptive  and
explanatory elements which are lacking in formal definitions. Learners and experts use
both figurative, qualitative analysis as well as literal, quantitative formulation. However,
even formal notation, as illustrated by the use of the concept cell in topology, is subject to
differing interpretations according to the specific purposes of the language/concept user.
30 In the following section we will examine some consequences of the persistence of the
view of  specialised language in light  of  the transparent  windowpane metaphor.  This
outdated metaphor or communication paradigm seriously underestimates the impact of
situational interpretation, instantiation or Parole in specialist discourse.
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3. Ignoring assumptive frameworks 
31 We have seen that scientific concepts require formal notation and definition, but may
also need metaphorical  description and explanation. Students focus first  on essential
information and they are the ones to judge what is essential since they are the final
consumers of a text. In other words, the learner establishes his own approach to a text
and that defines what user expectations are. The instantiation of Language, the industry
of Parole,  uses the transformational capacities of metaphor to generate boundaries of
meaning. Metaphor or nomadic concepts, which according to Isabelle Stengers (1987) are
notions borrowed from other fields, operate within these assumptive frameworks. We
will examine some consequences of this approach below. 
 
3.1. Metaphors in a ‘relativist’ context
32 Emerging technologies require new words and frequently borrow from other fields which
may be contiguous or  totally  unrelated.  What  features  or  defining characteristics  do
biological cells and mathematical cells share? Alternatively, what do the words “syntax”,
“semantics”, “grammar” mean when the computer scientist refers to them instead of the
(natural) language teacher? In nearly all cases, meanings expand, contract or are reduced
due to their transfer through differing assumptive frameworks. The French philosopher,
Paul Ricoeur, in a series of dialogues with the neuroscientist J.-P. Changeux, refers to this
as semantic duality.
De  cette  hypothèse  de  travail  qui  rend  possible  un  échange  d’informations  et
d’arguments  entre  philosophes  et  scientifiques,  je  tirerai  une  maxime,  non  de
complaisance,  mais  de  concession:  face  à  des  connexions  bien  établies,  le
scientifique s’autorise lui-même —ou plutôt est autorisé par le consentement tacite de
la  communauté  scientifique—  à  introduire  dans  ses  modèles  explicatifs  des
explications  mixtes  abrégées  qui  démentent  le  dualisme  sémantique.  Ainsi  le
scientifique  s’autorise-t-il  à  dire  que  le  cerveau  est  ‘concerné’  par  tel  ou  tel
phénomène mental,  qu’il  y  est  ‘impliqué’,  qu’il  est  ‘responsable  de’.  (...)  Pour le
philosophe,  grand  lecteur  de  textes  scientifiques,  c’est  un  devoir  d’ajouter  la
tolérance sémantique à la critique sémantique ; de ratifier pratiquement ce qu’il
dénonce sémantiquement. (Ricoeur 1998: 55) (my italics)
33 Is the scientist lying when he states that the brain is “concerned”? Or is it his subjective
construction  of  language  and  therefore  relative  vision  of  truth?  For  the  French
semanticist, Robert Martin, this instantiation of language reflects one’s universe of beliefs
which is constrained by the concept of the individual —the univers de croyance of the given
person. Martin uses the notation Uje to illustrate this semantic value.
Le propre de la vérité langagière —constatation banale mais qui n’en est pas moins
décisive—  est  une  vérité  prise  en  charge  par  un  sujet.  Un  énoncé  est  vrai  pour
quelqu’un. Tout l’effort du locuteur consiste à faire admettre ce qu’il croit être vrai.
Peu importe que le locuteur mente: aux yeux du linguiste est vrai ce que le locuteur
asserte, la présomption étant celle de la sincérité. Peu importe que le locuteur se
trompe, que ce qu’il dit être vrai ne corresponde pas aux données de l’univers. Une
assertion véhicule en tant que telle sa propre vérité ; celle-ci vaut à tout le moins à
l’intérieur d’un univers dont le locuteur —à tort ou à raison, de bonne foi ou non—
se porte garant. (Martin 1992: 38) (my italics)
34 Clearly then, the truth value of a statement, be it literal or metaphorical, lies in the eye of
the beholder.
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 3.2. Metaphors in a demetaphored context
35 Consideration of truth, be it literal, metaphoric or demetaphored, leads to the criticism
the American physicist, Alan Sokal and Belgian physicist and philosopher of science, Jean
Bricmont, formulated against French intellectuals and cognitive relativism in general.
Their book, Les Impostures intellectuels is becoming a best-seller and engineering students
and scientific instructors feel a sort of revenge is being rightfully accomplished. Sokal
and Bricmont state that they intend to illustrate how physico-mathematical concepts are
abused and when this is reiterated, abuse becomes an imposture. They feel that specific,
well-known texts are considered profound simply because they appear incomprehensible.
For Sokal and Bricmont they are meaningless and they state “Sous les habits d’empereur,
le roi  est nu”.  Sokal and Bricmont intend to defend the “canons de rationalité et de
l’honnêteté intellectuelle” so they examine the truth values of concepts used by authors
who use certain scientific concepts for their own specific purposes which are not those
for which they were originally designed. We could call it the unauthorised borrowing or
trespassing over nomadic concepts.
36 Sokal and Bricmont claim to be modest in their approach:
Quant aux vérités profondes contenues dans les textes que nous citons, il est vrai
que nous ne les percevons pas. (1997: 18) 
37 However they seem to be more confident in their conclusions: 
Par conséquent, nous restons sceptiques sur l’existence de ces vérités profondes.
(1997: 18)
38 Among other notions, Sokal and Bricmont criticise Lacan’s mathematics. They comment
on  conferences  which  were  given;  the  language  retained  is  in  a  spoken  form.  They
criticise Lacan’s use of topology and quote a conference given in 1972:
Dans cet espace de la jouissance, prendre quelque chose de borné, fermé, c’est un
lieu, et en parler, c’est une topologie. 
39 The authors contend that espace, borné, fermé, and topologie are mathematical terms and
Lacan’s text is therefore gobbledegook since the combination of these terms, according to
their absolute values would amount to nonsense. A student in psychology would however
probably not retain mathematical truth values for these terms; rather he would activate
his own assumptive framework and focus on the aspects which pertain to his study. The
engineer granting absolute, formal value to these terms would be disoriented in his effort
to learn about Lacanien psychology. Clearly, in this case, the terms espace, borné, fermé are
sufficiently marked in psychology; at the very least they are so polysemic as to afford an
interpretative assessment. That is, one which is attributed for a specific purpose —the
specific purpose at hand— which is not necessarily its original one. One way of analysing
how concepts  roam from one  field  to  another  would  be  to  examine  the  assumptive
frameworks which underpin the instantiation. In other words, the metaphor, even in a
literal or demetaphored expression, is still to some degree, alive and kicking.
40 The  student  studying  Lacan  would  probably  not  focus  on  the  absolute  value  of
mathematical  concepts  used  to  describe  humanity.  He  might  well  be  in  complete
ignorance of these mathematical concepts. Rather he would use them as touches of paint
to approach some form of qualitative understanding —such as the analogy of modelling
clay for cell in topology, or flowing water for electricity. The successful student would
refer  to  his  own  universe  of  belief,  his  Uje  to  access  Lacan’s  description  of  the
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subconscious. One need not know about the quality of the clay or the heat of the water to
foster a qualitative approach. Accessing Lacan’s text requires the attribution of a more
contextual, relative value for these adopted and thereby distorted terms. Few scholars
read Lacan to learn math. Sokal and Bricmont seem to expect all  uses of math to be
rigorously true —although, from the point of view of the humanities, would it not be
rather worrisome to require an understanding of the subconscious in terms of absolute
values? Emerging theories in the humanities, literary criticism, psychology or the special
fields of linguistics require new concepts and researchers grapple for words to describe
them. Borrowing terms from other sciences is one way of bridging this gap.
 
Conclusion
41 Metaphor  poses  specific  problems  for  both  onomasiologically-oriented  terminology
theory and applied terminography.  Traditional  terminological  tools  identify  relations
between concepts (generic to specific) and link monosemic terms to them via definition.
The  other  partners  of  the  didactic  process  description  and  explanation,  are  more
explicitly metaphoric and therefore more difficult to process on information-lean term
files.  Contemporary  metaphor  theory  has  developed  tools  to  account  for  metaphor;
source  and  target  fields,  assumptive  frameworks,  and  systems  of  associated
commonplaces. Behind the precise terminology of a given scientific field, there are living
root metaphors which structure the comprehension of phenomena. Metaphor theory can
help shed light on some of the ambiguous aspects of terminological work. For example, is
it the specific purpose of a text that establishes the legitimacy of its metaphors? Or is
their validity grounded in an infinitely regressive, outside authority with a putative bird’s
eye view. 
42 We have seen that were a student to apply an excellent understanding of mathematics to
the study of Lacan he would be bound for failure. By teaching a language aren’t we also
trying to learn the language of otherness – a different set of absolute or relative values?
Learning  more  than  words  and  conventions  of  discourse  can  lead  to  more  flexible
interpretative skills  –  and a new way of  seeing things.  Reading for specific  purposes
implies this non-neutral approach to text. It implicitly recognises the legitimacy of the
author’s position.
43 Assumptive frameworks and systems of associated commonplaces can help situate new
knowledge  and  adapt  our  previous way  of  seeing  things.  They  can  also,  at  least
theoretically, account for modifications in language use. Metaphors challenge the status
quo. Theoretical advances account for the way metaphors work and make explicit what is
considered literal within each designated discourse community. In this way metaphor
theory and terminology theory could be of mutual benefit to each other.
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NOTES
1.  Experiential  and  phenomenological  are  similar  adjectives  with  different  genealogies.
 Experientialism comes from the American philosopher John Dewey (Experience and Nature, 1927),
and is based on experience as a unitary aesthetic whole.  Phenomenology, as defended by, for
example,  Paul  Ricoeur,  refers  to  the  world  as  people  experience  it,  opposing  the  myth of  a
noumenal world underlying experience.  
ABSTRACTS
Terminology is one of the main industries of specialised communication. This paper proposes an
account of how metaphors and terms interact when students learn scientific concepts and the
linguistic processes that drive designation when researchers try to name emerging concepts.
Selected  tools  of  metaphor  theory:  assumptive  frameworks,  conceptual  blending,  source  and
target fields will be presented along with terminological tools including concept description and
term definition which, if only theoretically, lead to monosemous, field-restricted terms.
La terminologie est une industrie de base dans la communication spécialisée. L’auteur examine
l’interaction  entre  métaphores  et  termes  techniques  lors  de  l’apprentissage  des  concepts
scientifiques, ainsi que les processus linguistiques de désignation des concepts nouveaux. Une
sélection d’outils qui relève de la théorie de la métaphore : le cadre de présupposés, l’agrégation
conceptuelle,  les  champs  sources  et  les  champs  cibles  est  présentée.  Deux  outils  de  la
terminologie, la description de concepts et la définition des termes ont pour but, au moins dans
la théorie, de fournir des termes monosémiques dans un champ restreint.
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